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ABSTRACT
Cyber-clever criminals who are aware of the consequence of using mobile phones during conducting
crimes often stay away from their phones while involved in crimes. Some of them even change their
handset and SIM card, subsequently . This article looks into how intentional disassociation (and
even unintentional non-use) of mobile phone in non-cybercrimes, can become evidential clues of the
perpetrators' involvement in criminal acts. With the help of a recent judicial episode, this article
reveals how extremely careful and masterful handling of extensive and voluminous CDRs and tower
dumps by a cyber-savvy investigating official can unearth evidential clues to locate the perpetrator,
even when the perpetrator stayed away from his or her mobile phone while committing the crime.
This is not a typical case study article, but an article to report a rare, live episode in cyber forensics
which can be procedurally highly informative for cyber investigators and related researchers
worldwide.
Keywords: CDR, Call Details Records, Cyber investigation, Crime investigation, tower dump,
Police, Kerala Police

l.

INTRODUCTION

In today's world, dominated by the magical
device of omnipresent mobile phones, criminals
conducting traditional, non-cybercrimes often
tend to use mobile phones while committing
crimes. As a knock-on effect of their phone use,
they often leave behind different types of
"footprints" in the form of data in the cyber
space.
Accordingly, modern, clever, and dedicated
investigators of non-cybercrimes often search
through the cyber space too for the presence of
such "footprints" and use them as instruments
to track criminals or even as potential evidence.
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No wonder then that cyber-clever criminals
who are aware of the potential danger of using
mobile phones during conducting crimes stay
away from their phones while involved in crimes
and even change their handset and SIM card,
subsequently. By doing so, they attempt to
ensure that they do not leave any cyber
evidence of their presence in the crime scene or
their criminal act and/ or of their physical
movement as part of the crime. Needless to say,
such a cyber-savvy precaution by any criminal
will normally make his or her phone tracks
remain 'invisible' or untraceable to the police,
and hence will drastically reduce the criminal's
chance of being suspected, especially when there
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is absence of human witness and other physical
evidence.
Such a crime scenario will surely make the
job of the cyber investigation expert difficult
and will demand the use of non-conventional
approaches in cyber forensics in order to
identify, trace, and locate the criminal. Hence,
cyber investigation experts worldwide need to
be made aware of the possible non-conventional
approaches to intelligently handle such difficult
situations.
With such an objective, this article
documents a non-conventional way adopted by
an intelligent cyber investigation expert of the
Kerala Police in order to identify, trace and
locate a clever rapist-cum-murderer who had
conducted the crime without leaving any direct,
explicit , physical as well as cyber trace.

2.
A CRilVUNAL
EPISODE AND ITS

CYBER
(NON)CONNECTION
Ironically, intentional disassociation and even
unintentional non-use of mobile phone does not
necessarily exempt or exonerate the owner of a
phone. Indeed, the absence or non-use of a
phone can itself lead on to evidential clues of his
or her involvement in criminal acts. Extremely
careful and masterful handling of extensive and
voluminous telecom records by the investigating
team can unearth evidential clues even in such
situations. Thus, acts of om1ss1on can
paradoxically lead on to evidence of commission
in cyber forensics.
Such an extremely careful evaluation is not
new in research. Various related theoretical
studies have already revealed that careful
evaluation of large telecom call graphs (with
rich temporal and geographical labels on their
edges), generated from massive telecom data,
can successfully provide crucial information on
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various hidden call patterns in the telecom
networks (Pundit et al, 2008 , Phadke et al,
2013).
In an actual real-life criminal incident, a
clever rapist-cum-murderer was recently
successfully traced by the clever handling of
massive 8.4 million tower dump data and also
by unearthing hidden call patterns from this
massive data by a local police team. This
perpetrator, who was a migrant labourer with
no past criminal history and working in southwestern India, had stopped using his mobile
phone long before conducting the crime and had
even changed his handset twice and SIM card
once, after the criminal act. In addition, he had
made sure that his telephone was only
minimally used during his travel of about 2500
miles across the country after conducting the
crime and then again was never used during the
subsequent travel of about 2000 miles, both
within 40 days of committing the crime.
The role and significance of the cyber
evidence against the criminal was later crucially
justified and vindicated since the criminal's
the
crime
was
later
involvement
m
unequivocally established through a DNA
match and the trial court even gave him the
death sentence. Section 169 (titled "Call Data
Records," pages 208 to 241) of the 410-page
judgment narrates the way the police cyber
expert innovatively used the information
relating to the mobile calls in order to trace,
locate, and catch the perpetrator.
Generally, prima facie absence of telephone
evidence in such cases persuades the
investigating police team not to pursue the
cyber part any more. Even so, an apparent lack
of telephone evidence may not really be a lack
of evidence and a very dedicated and clever
cyber-savvy police officer can still derive
intelligent facts by thoroughly investigating the
details and the background of the perceived
absence of telephone evidence. Occasionally,
such an investigation can be extremely complex
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and complicated, but for a well-motivated cyber
expert, that itself can be a provocative push for
more intense and often challengingly strange
findings. A reasonably detailed account of the
approach, procedures and methods used by the
cyber-savvy police officer in the case mentioned
above appears to be very relevant for an insight
into the cyber modus-operandi for such cases.

3.
THE RECENT
INDIAN STORY OF
SUCCESSFUL CYBERTRACING OF A RAPISTMURDERER
On 28 th of April 2016, a 30-year-old woman
(whose name is not disclosed here as also
preferred in the judgment) was found brutally
assaulted and dead at her home on the outskirts
of the town of Perumbavoor in the Ernakulam
district of the state of Kerala in South India.
The police team, which first arrived at the
crime spot , found that most parts of the dead
body, especially the genitals, were brutally
damaged, with bloodstains all over the body,
that her intestines were pulled out and that the
dress on the dead body was soaked with blood.
Subsequently, the police registered a criminal
case (Case, 2016) and sent the body for
postmortem after completing the initial
formalities.
In a couple of days, the crime incident
received national importance and wide public
attention through the media, for various
reasons. Firstly, the murdered woman was an
undergraduate student of law in the prestigious
Government Law College nearby. Secondly, she
belonged to a financially-challenged family who
were housed in a temporary hut on the
government-owned land nearby the Periyarvally
irrigation canal. She was staying with her
mother a casual labourer as her father had
'
abandoned the family when she was a child.
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Thirdly, she belonged to a traditionally underprivileged Indian ethnic community which
officially falls in the special protective category
namely "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes." All these heightened and intensified the
police attention on the investigation and the
search for the culprit(s).
on
the
postmortem
report
Based
(postmortem, 2016), the preliminary and
traditional police investigation did unearth
enough evidence to establish rape and murder,
but there was not enough evidence to identify
and locate the perpetrator(s).
The biological forensics experts soon found
that the DNA of one of the bloodstains found
on the body did not actually match with the
victim's DNA (RGCB, 2016) and so, suggested
that the perpetrator( s) too may have been
injured and bled during the crime. Accordingly,
the police re-oriented their course of action to
locate the person with this DNA.
However, locating the person with this DNA
in this thickly populated state was not an easy
task. The population of this tiny south-western
Indian state (which is not much larger than
Maryland in the USA) is 34 million (which is
almost the same as that of big California)
(Census, 2011). In addition, the crime spot,
which is very close to the thickly populated
Perumbavoor town, was multi-ethnic, housing
several thousands of migrant laborers of diverse
Indian communities too.
All these complex, demographic difficulties
induced the police to incorporate a few
necessary scientific cyber procedures also into
their investigation tactics in order to locate the
criminal in the strong belief that the criminal
may have used a mobile phone during the crime.
This belief was scientifically backed-up by the
fact that this tiny state had already achieved a
mobile phone density of 110% of the population
(TRAI, 2017).
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Accordingly, from the various telecom
companies operating in the area of crime, the
police collected around a huge mass of over 1
million mobile tower dump data (or the
metadata of each communicational activity
relating to mobile phone of all those present
under the various mobile towers installed
around the crime spot) generated during the
two hours before and the two hours after the
crime. Further, they scientifically analyzed this
tower dump data (obtained in the Microsoft
Excel format) with the objective of creating a
list of suspects. However, after systematically
sieving out and removing all "normal" and
"innocent" data from this tower dump, they
failed to locate any suspicious number or any
susp1c1ous
IMEI
(International
Mobile
Equipment Identity) code in it. Thus, it became
almost evident to the police that the suspect
had not used a mobile phone in connection with
the crime and that their investigation using
telecom records would not deliver any more
fruitful results.
Strong media publicity (TNIE, 2016) and
active public attention made the authorities
decide to take on a more rigorous cyber
investigation policy, and so the investigation
team was further strengthened by a police
officer who, although not qualified in computer
science, had enjoyed a successful track record
with his intuitive (as against, trained) skills to
analyze around massive 2-3 million telephone
call-related details to locate criminals in several
sensitive cases, ranging from political murder to
anti-national activities. The team thus
definitely achieved greater cyber-savvy and
fortification and the modus operandi of the
newly joined expert is the basis of the
'something from nothing' cyber evidence
focused herein.
This police officer chose to begin his duty
with the CDR (Call Details Records for the past
one year, obtained in the Microsoft Excel
format) of the mobile number of the victim. By
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using the pivot table facility of the Microsoft
Excel, he ranked all the contacts found in it
according to the total time the victim had spent
with each of them over phone during the past
one year. The objective of such a ranking was
to find if the victim had any telephonic contacts
with anyone enjoying past criminal history and
an immoral life style (measured along the
standards often followed by the well-knit,
orthodox society of this southern-Indian state of
Kerala with 100% literacy and close to 110%
mobile phone density). With this rank-list, the
field squad of the police investigation team
proved that no one in the rank-list had any
criminal-past , that the victim's past life was
quite normal and that the perpetrator(s) could
very unlikely to be one from among those
telephonically communicated with the victim
during the past one year.
In addition, this police officer logically
collected and analyzed a gigantic load of 8.4
million tower dump data (also obtained in the
Microsoft Excel format). This data came from
the around 15 mobile phone towers installed 56 miles around the crime spot and covering the
preceding 48 hours and the succeeding 24 hours
of the incident.
The data scientifically
established that the chance for the criminal to
have used a mobile phone in connection with the
crime was very remote.
Proceeding further, the officer used these
same 8.4 million tower dump data to list out
(and also to rank them based on their non-use)
all the mobile phones which were suspiciously
silent for hours together before the crime had
happened. In this rank list (which was also
prepared using the pivot table facility of the
Microsoft Excel) , he zeroed-in on a particular
mobile number which was not in use since
1:05AM on 27th April 2016, 40 hours before the
crime had happened. The SIM card relating to
the number was traced then to its owner, S. K.
Saharul, a migrant labourer who lived in the
locality of the crime. However, according to the
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police records, neither the mobile number nor
its owner had any past criminal history, and so
there was no reason for the police to suspect
him. Even so, for a total confirmatory exclusion
of this number from the crime, the police officer
obtained the CDR of this SIM card from the
telephone service provider and analyzed it. He
found that there were absolutely no incoming
and outgoing calls and no text messages during
the 40 hours before the crime. Surprisingly,
there was no record of even messages that
should have been routinely there. This absence
of messages that should have been routinely and
unavoidably there, no matter what , raised his
suspicion as it suggested the owner's intentional
dissociation of the phone from communicational
traffic (as against an unintentional, natural
silence of the phone).
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records of delivery of even messages that should
have been routinely and unavoidably there.

Delving further , he noted in the CDR that
this telephone number (that means, the SIM
card) was again made operational four hours
after the incident (that means, after remaining
non-operational for 44 hours) when it was under
a mobile phone tower installed at the nearby
Perumbavoor town. However, the mobile
handset used before the crime was certainly
different from the mobile handset used after the
crime as indicated by the difference in the IMEI
codes found in the meta-details of the calls in
the CDR.

Altogether, in the above process intended to
totally exclude this number from crime, the
police ironically found that there were quite a
few suggestive factors for its involvement in the
crime. Firstly, the mobile phone was inactive 40
hours before the crime and then, until 4 hours
after the crime. Secondly, there was evidence of
a sudden change of handset. Thirdly, it
appeared that the phone has been moving by
rail thousands of miles across the country
immediately after the crime had happened.
Fourthly, during most of this time there were
periods of long non-use of the phone (and this
history and pattern of non-use during this short
period did not tally with the history and pattern
of non-use of the phone during the previous one
year). Finally, the final instance of the use of
the phone was located to be in the owner's
native land after which, even messages that
should have been routinely and unavoidably
there were also seen to have been undelivered.
All these strongly suggested an effort to
disconnect or dissociate oneself from the phone
and to suddenly move away across the country
with
an
attempt
to
be
minimally
communicating using the phone. So, the owner
of the number, S. K. Saharul became a suspect
in this case.

Also, from the CDR, it was noted that not
only was the handset different, but the locations
too were totally different. In addition, it was
noteworthy that the subsequent mobile phone
activities showed locational connections with a
stretch of railway stations wide apart across the
country. The final activity from this number
was an outgoing call made on 2nd May 2016,
four days after the incident, from Dumdumiya,
a remote village in the state of Assam which is
as far as 2500 miles away from the crime spot.
After this final activity, the SIM card was
suspected to have been dissociated from
communicational traffic again as there were no

Further, the whole forensic task became
more complex when it came out that the
Saharul had in fact never left the place, and was
still about and around, but had preferred not to
entertain any family relationship or friendship
with anyone in the CDR of his number. Upon
interrogation, Saharul revealed to the police
that it was not he, but his friend, by the name
'Ameer-ul Islam' who had been actually and
illegally using the SIM card for that long. The
police had no reason to disbelieve Saharul's
revelation because Ameer-ul Islam (who
belonged to Saharul's home state), was also a
migrant labourer staying in the town near the

@ 2018 ADFSL

Page 101

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
crime spot. Moreover, the frequent contacts
(obtained from the CDR of the SIM card)
consisted of Ameer-ul-Islam's wife father
'
'
brother and a few other kith and kin and did
not include any of Saharul's kith or kin.
Assuming the possibility that Saharul can
be discounted but Ameer-ul Islam can be listed
as a suspect, the police then physically
conducted a raid at the temporary home of
Ameer-ul Islam nearby the crime spot and found
that he had left home a few hours after the
crime had happened and that he did not leave
behind any kind of biological traces at his
temporary home to obtain his DNA
information. Thus, at that stage, Ameer-ul
Islam had remained a potential suspect-at-large
with absolutely no helpful evidence to confirm
his involvement in the crime. Yet , the police
proceeded with their plan to trace, locate, and
then interrogate him.
More confirming cyber facts emerged while
interrogating the friends and relatives staying
with Ameer-ul Islam. The police learned that he
was seen engaged in an argumentative telephone
call with his wife after which he had broken his
mobile handset by throwing it against the wall
sometime just past midnight on 27th April 2016
(which was about 40 hours before the crime had
happened). It was further revealed that Ameerul Islam was away from home during the
subsequent 2 days (including the day on which
the crime had happened) but had returned
home in the evening with a sudden plan to leave
for his hometown, 2500 miles away (such a
sudden, non-preplanned trip home was
uncommon in this well-knit, communally
orthodox group of migrant labourers). In
addition, one of his fellow residents (who was
his father's brother's son and also a migrant
labourer) revealed to the police that he had
handed over a new mobile handset to Ameer-ul
Islam as a gift to be handed over to his mother
in his hometown near Dumdumiya in Assam,
and that he had later heard from his mother
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that Ameer-ul Islam had indeed promptly
delivered it to her. All these crucial pieces of
information (including the IMEI of the gifted
handset) and also the pieces of related
information subsequently collected from the
home town of Ameer-ul Islam (with the help of
the Assam Police) were actually corroborating
with the predictions of the cyber police officer.
However, unlike he assumed, the absence of
mobile phone evidence was not due to the
perpetrator's intentional attempt to disassociate
his phone from the crime but was because his
mobile handset was actually dysfunctional since
1:05 AM, 40 hours before the crime had
happened.
Anyway, with the motivation gained by the
perfect corroboration of his cyber-predictions,
the police officer proceeded further to put the
mobile numbers of Ameer-ul Islam and his
nearest kith and kin under surveillance and then
waited for Ameer-ul Islam to further call them
either using his original SIM card (after loading
it in a new mobile handset) or using another
SIM card in a new handset. Also, at regular
intervals, the officer kept on sending text
messages to the mobile number of Ameer-ul
Islam with the hope that at least one of these
messages will be delivered as and when his SIM
card became functional and that the metadata
of such a delivery can remain evidential to
locate him. Just as the officer expected, on 6th
June 2016, the 40 th day of the crime, a message
sent to his mobile was found promptly delivered
onto his mobile which was an indication to the
police that the original SIM card of Ameer-ul
Islam had become once again active after a gap
of 40 days. From the IMEI code contained in
the meta-details of the delivery of this message,
the police noted that he was using a new mobile
handset. Moreover, the tower location in the
meta-details suggested that he was then at
Kanchipuram which is a place in the southeastern Indian state of Tamilnadu, about 2000
miles south of his home town and about 400
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miles east of the crime spot. This telecom
information was decisive for the investigating
team and they soon sent their field squad to
Kanchipuuram with a plan to conduct a
combing operation there to locate him. But , by
the time the team reached Kanchipuram, the
original SIM card of Ameer-ul Islam was once
again found non-functional as there were no
specific traces of his further movements.

Such a successful, scientific, and nonconventional investigation by the Kerala Police
using cyber forensics in order to locate, trace,
and eventually convict such a perpetrator
deserves international attention, for various
reasons.

In addition to this decisive, crucial
information, the police cyber expert soon noted
that Ameer-ul Islam's kith and kin had already
started receiving calls from Kanchipuram from
a new SIM card. This new SIM card was then
traced to its owner, Udayakumar, who,
ironically, was found totally unrelated to
Ameer-ul Islam's family members. However,
upon interrogation, Udayakumar revealed to
the police field squad that , through his friend,
he had recently sold his SIM card illegally to
Ameer-ul Islam. With his and his friend's help,
the police soon successfully located Ameer-ul
Islam in Kanchipuram and took him into
custody on the 59th day of the crime incident.

Firstly, this case was a traditional rape and
murder with no human witness and also with no
helpful clues found in the CDR of the victim's
mobile number. There were no clues in the ±2hour tower dump generated during the crime
either. Generally, absence of telephone evidence
in such cases persuades the police not to pursue
the telecom call lists any more. But, in this case,
by assuming that apparent lack of telephone
evidence may not really be a lack of evidence,
the police officer had expanded his investigation
by collecting more telecom records generated
days before and after the crime had happened
and apparently derived intelligent facts from it,
innovatively.

They then forcibly took his blood sample
and sent it for DNA matching. A successful
cross-match of his DNA (with the DNA
obtained from the bloodstains found on the dead
body and also on the cloths nearby) proved
(RGSB , 2016) that he was present at the crime
spot and had shed blood there and so could have
had a part in the crime.

Secondly, the temporarily inactive SIM card
found belonged to one among the hundred
thousand generally active SIM cards found in
the thickly populated area around the crime
scene where the SIM card density was more
than 100% of the population. Identifying such
an active SIM card with such an hours-long
inactivity history from a gigantic 8.4 million call
records demanded absolute cyber forensic
brilliance, supreme cleverness and sheer
dedicated persistence from the part of the police
officer who was equipped only with a laptop and
Microsoft Excel. He approached and carried out
his task by using the various innovative
alternatives in a systematic manner. His
successful identification of this SIM card turned
out to be a crucial milestone in the success of
the investigation of this crime, and undoubtedly
provides an interesting precedent in clever
forensic procedure.

This confirmation marked the end of the
successful searching of the police cyber expert
along the cyber space for the person carrying
the particular DNA.
Later, the trial court finally found him
guilty of both rape and murder and awarded
him the capital punishment of death sentence,
subject to the confirmation of the High Court of
Kerala (Judgment, 2017).
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4.
REASONS FOR
REPORTING THIS CASE
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Thirdly, in a densely populated country
(with population close to 1.3 billion, more than
four times that of the US and the second largest
in the world) and with an area close to only 1.3
million square miles (only slightly more than
one-third of that of the US), and with an ethnocultural,
linguistic,
and
communicative
diversity more than found in any nation in the
world (Census, 2011), tracing the movement of
this already identified SIM card also demanded
absolute cyber inventiveness and innovation on
the part of this police officer especially when the
SIM user, a migrant labourer, had changed his
handset twice and this SIM card once, and had
travelled almost 4500 miles during the following
40 days of the crime with an absolute minimal
use of his SIM card.
Cyber investigation experts and related
researchers worldwide are expected to be made
aware of such possible non-conventional
approaches to intelligently handle such difficult
and unfavorable forensic situations.

5.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, modern crime investigation depends
heavily on digital evidence which is something
that is automatically created during use or
abuse of digital equipment while conducting
crimes. Digital evidence, if properly backed by
scientific methods, often helps investigation
agencies to unequivocally establish not just
abuses of digital equipment but also solve
various other traditional crimes in which digital
equipment is involved. Not only presence of the
information generated by such digital gadgets
but also the absence of the mandatory
information generated by such digital gadgets
can remain evidential If analyzed cleverly and
inferred brilliantly, the apparent absence need
not be an unhelpful negative forensic
phenomenon, but can lead on to positive
evidential clues, as revealed by the live, actual
and rare cyber forensic instance, mentioned
above.
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